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  We seek to contribute to the emerging economic theory on trade, the environment 
and development.  Using panel data across countries, econometric models are estimated 
to predict the effects of openness on organic water pollutant (BOD) and carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions.  Results indicate that freer trade significantly increases emissions of 
both pollutants, thus reducing environmental quality.  Moreover, the panel nature of the 
data allows heterogeneity across countries to be controlled, so that comparisons can be 
made of how different national characteristics influence the environmental impact of 
freer trade.  By testing the effects of democratic versus autocratic governance, it is found 
that while greater democracy can induce significant reductions in BOD emissions as 
openness increases, it may also lead to increased CO2 levels.  Meanwhile, by testing for 
and failing to reject the pollution haven hypothesis, it is suggested that environmental 
gains from openness in relatively rich countries may be coming at the expense of 
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  Few economists would argue with the assertion that trade liberalization increases 
incomes across countries.  Freer trade leads to more goods available at lower prices than 
would otherwise be the case.  However, many questions still revolve around other 
potential effects of openness to trade.  This paper will focus on one of these questions:  
What is the effect of freer trade on the environment?  Issues that are examined include 
how trade liberalization affects the environment in individual nations and whether or not 
these effects can be assumed to carry across both developed and developing countries.  
Attention is also focused on how different trade policies may distort the relationship 
between openness and the environment, and what potential policy responses may be 
implemented to balance these effects.  The approach taken is based on emerging 
economic theory on trade, environment and development. 
  Extensive debate currently exists over these issues.  Many environmentalists are 
concerned that trade liberalization will create international political pressure to reduce the 
stringency of environmental regulations, creating a “race to the bottom”.  Advocates of 
freer trade counter that openness between countries generates an economic surplus which 
can be applied to environmental protection (Damania et al, 2003; Karp et al, 2003).  A 
central issue in this discussion is the potential for trade liberalization to increase incomes, 
encouraging economic growth.  Two studies by Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995), 
find evidence in support of an inverse U-shaped relationship between per capita income 
growth and pollution levels.  Referred to as the Environmental Kuznet’s Curve (EKC), 
this relationship hypothesizes that economic growth in a country will bring an initial 
period of environmental deterioration, followed by a subsequent phase of improvement.  
The policy impacts of the EKC hypothesis could be significant, since it finds no evidence   2
that economic growth related to free trade does unavoidable harm to the environment. 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995) 
  According to Antweiler et al (2001), however, the relevant economic theory gives 
little reason to believe that free trade will influence all countries in the same way.  
Instead, when considering the relationship between openness and the environment, it is 
important to consider the interactions between scale, composition, and technique effects 
created by different national characteristics and trading opportunities (Antweiler et al, 
2001; Copeland and Taylor, 2004).  The scale effect of openness to trade increases 
environmental degradation through more intensive production.  The technique effect 
reflects cleaner production processes, which arise from increasing demands for 
environmental quality as income levels rise.  The composition effect will shift production 
between environmentally beneficial or damaging goods, depending on the competitive 
advantages between trading partners.  The relative strength and direction of these effects 
will cause the impact of trade liberalization on the environment to differ across countries. 
  Furthermore, theoretical analysis highlights the potential for government policy 
and environmental regulations to determine these effects.  The pollution haven effect 
hypothesizes that the stringency of environmental regulation distorts how competitive 
advantages are utilized by influencing plant location decisions and trade flows (Copeland 
and Taylor, 2004).  Meanwhile, Deacon and Mueller (2004) argue that corrupt 
governance may impede the technique effect by rendering governments unresponsive to 
public demands for greater environmental quality.    Damania et al (2003) and Welsch 
(2004) also find that corruption can directly cause environmental degradation by reducing 
the effectiveness of environmental regulations such as emissions limits.  Both the 
pollution haven effect and corrupt governance could thus affect the transferability of the 
EKC between countries.   
  To investigate these relationships further, an empirical study of the effects of 
trade liberalization on a country’s environment is reported in this paper.  Panel data 
across countries is utilized, including measures of pollution such as carbon dioxide 
emissions and organic water pollutant emissions, to evaluate the environmental effects of 
freer trade.  Models test the effects of trade liberalization to see whether an EKC is 
observable in all or only particular countries.  Moreover, the panel nature of the data   3
allows heterogeneity between nations to be controlled, so that comparisons can be made 
of how national characteristics influence the impact of freer trade.  Consequently, the 
hypothesis that the environmental effects of trade liberalization are transferable between 
developed and developing countries can be tested.  Finally, a variable to control for 
governance is included in the model to specifically estimate the influence of democracy 
in determining the environmental impacts of openness to trade.  This study is unique in 
its application of panel data to evaluate the impacts of trade liberalization on the 
environment while controlling for national characteristics that can distort the competing 
scale, technique and composition effects among countries.   
 
2.0. Literature Review 
  This paper adds to a larger literature which has sought to identify the relationships 
between trade, economic growth and environmental quality.  In addition to the works 
described above, Antweiler et al (2001) apply panel data on sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
concentrations to a theoretical model which divides trade’s impact into scale, technique 
and composition effects.  Their findings indicate that while the scale effect of openness 
increases concentrations of SO2 by 0.25 to 0.5 percent, it is outweighed by a larger 
reduction in concentrations (1.25 to 1.5 percent) from the trade induced technique effect.
1  
The overall effect of trade on pollution concentrations is thus beneficial, leading 
Antweiler et al (2001: 878) to conclude that “free trade is good for the environment.”
2 
  Frankel and Rose (2005) use cross-country data to address the question: “what is 
the effect of trade on a country’s environment, for a given level of GDP?”  Results of this 
study for three measures of air pollution show that openness tends to reduce sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxide (NO2), and particulate matter emissions.
3  Furthermore, 
the authors also test the pollution haven hypothesis by adding an interaction between  
                                                 
1 The composition effect is found to only lead to slight changes in pollution concentrations, and does not 
affect overall results (Antweiler et al, 2001). 
2 Of interest for the present study, Antweiler et al (2001: 878) make special note of the panel structure of 
their data set, which they were able to exploit in order to distinguish empirically between the negative scale 
effects of trade on the environment, and the positive technique effects of trade on the environment. 
3 It is interesting to note that only the reduction in SO2 emissions indicated strong statistical significance.  
The effect of openness in reducing NO2 was “moderately” significant, while the effect on particulates 
lacked statistical significance (Frankel and Rose, 2005).   4
openness and per capita income to their model, but find little evidence in favour of the 
hypothesized effect.  From their findings, Frankel and Rose (2005) conclude that while 
some results indicate that openness may help to reduce air pollution, there is little 
evidence that trade causes significant environmental degradation, ceteris paribus.  One 
important exception in their results is carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which trade 
tended to increase with moderate significance.  Frankel and Rose (2005: 88) account for 
this difference by observing that “CO2 is a purely global externality, and unlikely to be 
addressed by regulation at the national level.” 
  Further investigating this issue of global externalities and transboundary 
pollutants, Ansuategi (2003) tests the hypothesis that EKC’s only exist for pollutants with 
semi-local and medium term impacts.
4  Focusing on the relationship between income 
growth and sulphur emissions, Ansuategi (2003) finds that local pollutants are more 
likely to be effectively dealt with by governments than pollution that can be easily 
externalized to other countries.  These results mirror the findings of Cole et al (1997), 
who study 1986 CFC and halon emissions across countries.  Cole et al (1997) conclude 
that transboundary pollutants will increase monotonically with income or have EKC 
turning points at higher levels of per capita income if they are not subjected to a 
substantial government policy initiative.  Interestingly, Copeland and Taylor (2005) study 
the effects of policies that unilaterally reduce emissions in open economies and find that 
with free trade in goods, there are an infinite number of ways to reduce pollution 
efficiently, while in autarky there is only one.
5  Open economies may therefore be able to 
adopt emission reduction policies with greater efficiency than closed economies, creating 
a greater incentive to do so. 
  Several authors have also addressed the more specific impacts of governance on 
environmental quality.  As described in the introduction, corrupt governance can directly 
reduce the effectiveness of environmental policies that limit pollution, causing an upward  
 
                                                 
4 This hypothesis draws on the findings of Ansuategi and Perrings (2000) who show that self-interested 
planners deal with environmental problems sequentially, addressing those with the most immediate costs 
first, and those with costs more displaced in space later. 
5 The key to this finding, according to Copeland and Taylor (2005), is that international markets create 
asymmetries across countries that do not exist in autarky.  Openness thus generates the possibility of gains 
from trade effects, which can create an infinite number of efficient emission reduction paths for an 
economy.   5
shift in an EKC and an increase the per capita income level at which environmental  
improvements are realized (Damania et al, 2003; Welsch, 2004).
6  However, Welsch 
(2004) also identifies an indirect effect through which corruption reduces prosperity, thus 
decreasing per capita income levels.  This indirect effect will increase emissions for rich 
countries that operate on the downward sloping portion of their EKC, but reduce 
emissions for poor countries on the upward sloping portion.  It is interesting to note, then, 
that in the case of strictly declining environmental quality with economic growth, 
corruption may actually improve environmental conditions.  The net impact on emission 
levels of the direct and indirect effects of governance may therefore be counteracting, and 
must be empirically observed. 
 
3.0. Methodology 
 3.1.  Data 
  Panel data across countries is used to estimate the environmental effects of 
openness to trade.  All data, except for the governance index, has been obtained from the 
World Development Indicators Online Database, which is assembled by the World 
Bank.
7  The dependent variables under consideration are carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
and organic water pollutant (BOD) emissions.  CO2 emissions (measured in kilotons) are 
those stemming from the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement.  They 
include emissions produced during consumption of solid, liquid and gas fuels and gas 
flaring.  The dataset for CO2 is composed of measurements for 143 countries spanning 
the years 1970 to 2000.  Emissions of organic water pollutants (in kilograms per day) are 
measured by biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), which refers to the amount of oxygen 
that bacteria in water will consume when breaking down waste.  BOD is a standard 
water-treatment test for the presence of organic pollutants.  The dataset for BOD includes 
observations for 119 countries spanning the years 1980 to 1995. 
                                                 
6 Lopez and Mitra (2000) also investigate the effects of political corruption on the occurrence of an EKC 
for several pollution variables in developing countries.  Their results indicate an upward shift in the turning 
point of an EKC for developing countries with more corrupt governance. 
7 World Development Indicators is the World Bank’s database on development measures, and includes 
social, economic, financial, natural resources and environmental indicators for over 200 countries.  Data is 
freely available online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline.   6
  As discussed above, income may play a strong role in determining the 
environmental outcomes of trade across countries.  Per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), measured in constant 1995 US$, is therefore obtained to act as a proxy for the per 
capita income of a country.  To estimate the effects of openness on emissions, cross-
country data on trade levels, measured by the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP, is also obtained.  Additional data is gathered on total 
population levels per country, domestic land area (in square kilometers), and urban 
population levels (as a percentage of total population) in order to control for the possible 
influences of these national characteristics in explaining emissions of CO2 and BOD. 
  Data on governance is retrieved from the University of Maryland’s Polity IV 
project.
8  This dataset is assembled as an index, measuring the degree to which a nation is 
either autocratic or democratic on a scale from -10 to +10.
9  The Polity IV project 
considers fully democratic countries to display three essential elements: fully competitive 
political participation, institutionalized constraints on executive power, and guarantees of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and political participation.  Of note, for 
some countries and years Polity IV uses special codes instead of the -10 to +10 scale to 
indicate interruptions in government such as foreign occupations, collapses of central 
authority, or transitional political periods.  For estimation purposes, these special codes 
were re-fitted into the -10 to +10 scale as the average of the other autocratic/democratic 
observations for the country in question.  So as not to create bias, a dummy variable 
(Disrupt) was then created and set equal to one for the particular years in which a country 
had been coded as having a disruption in government.
10 
  Descriptive information on the datasets is provided in Appendix A.  For the BOD 
dataset, Table A:1 summarizes the mean data values and number of years observed for 
each of the 119 countries in the panel.  Similar information for the CO2 dataset is  
 
                                                 
8 The Polity IV project looks at political regime characteristics and transitions across countries, and is 
available from the World Resources Institutes’ Earth Trends website, http://earthtrends.wri.org. 
9 The scale is established with (-10=strongly autocratic, +10=strongly democratic). 
10 An alternative approach to the specially coded governance data would have been to simply drop these 
observations.  However, given the economic theory relating governance to the environment, it was 
hypothesized that political disruption could have significant environmental implications, meaning that these 
observations needed to be retained in the dataset.  Re-fitting these codes to the index, while adding a 
dummy variable as described above, was considered the best method to capture these effects.   7
 
summarized by Table A:2.  From this information, it should be addressed that complete 
panels of data could not be obtained for all countries in the dataset.  This is a common  
problem with panel data and can be corrected by using unbalanced panel estimation 
methods (Greene, 2003; Verbeek, 2004).  Unbalanced panel estimation avoids losses in 
efficiency by using all available observations, including those for countries that are not 
observed in all years of the dataset. 
 
  3.2. Econometrics
11 
  The use of panel data allows for the modeling of differences in behaviour across 
subjects.  Heterogeneity across countries is therefore the central focus of the empirical 
analysis in this paper.  To estimate models based on panel data, we can start with a 
simple linear model such as: 
yit = x’itβit + εit       (1) 
where βit  measures the partial effects of xit in year t for country i.  Panel data estimation 
then places additional structure on the coefficients, with the standard assumption being 
that βit is constant for all i and t.  To capture the effects on yit that are peculiar to each 
country i = 1, …, N, a separate set of N parameters, αi, are added to the model.  If the αi 
are assumed to be N fixed unknown parameters, capturing the effects of the independent 
variables that are specific to country i and constant over time, then we have the fixed 
effects model for panel data.  Alternatively, if the country specific parameters αi are 
treated as random drawings from a distribution with mean μ and variance σα
2, then we 
have the random effects model for panel data. 
  Evaluating the use of fixed effects versus random effects models, we find an 
important difference in the interpretation of results between the two.  According to 
Verbeek (2004), fixed effects models concentrate on the differences “within” individuals, 
therefore explaining to what extent the observed yt for country i differs from that 
country’s mean y.  A fixed effects model would therefore be appropriate if we wanted to  
 
                                                 
11 The econometric theory depicted in this section draws largely from the works of Greene (2003) and 
Verbeek (2004).   8
 
make predictions about the changes in emissions over time for a particular country, since 
the fixed effects estimators consider the distribution of yit given αi.  In random effects  
models, meanwhile, the estimated yit are not conditional on the individual country’s αi, as 
the model instead “integrates out” these random parameters.  A random effects model is 
thus more appropriate if we are not interested in the particular value of an individual 
country’s αi, but instead want to focus on the differences in emission levels across 
countries with certain characteristics.  Since the objective of this paper is to make 
inferences regarding the effect of openness on environmental quality, conditioned on the 
potential for national characteristics to influence results, the random effects model will be 
applied to our dataset. 
  Applying the assumptions of the random effects model to the simple linear model 
developed earlier, equation (1) can now be expressed as: 
yit = μ + x’itβ+ αi + εit ;  αi ~ IID(0, σα
2)     (2) 
                                          εit ~ IID(0, σε
2)        
where μ is the intercept term and the random parameters αi are assumed independently 
and identically distributed (IID) over countries.  Now, αi + εit can be treated as a single 
error term consisting of two components: an individual specific component αi which does 
not vary over time and a remainder component εit assumed to be uncorrelated over time.  
The random effects estimators will be unbiased and consistent if αi and εit can be assumed 
mutually independent, as well as independent of the observed x variables.
12 
  Applying this econometric theory, the model depicted in equation (2) will be 
estimated twice, once with BOD emissions as the dependent variable, and again with 
CO2 emissions as the dependent variable.  All variables included in the models are 





                                                 
12 Verbeek (2004) notes that the structure of the error component αi + εit will inherently induce a particular 
form of autocorrelation in random effects models.  Standard OLS estimators will therefore be inefficient, 
and this effect is corrected by deriving Feasible GLS estimators instead.  If all other assumptions hold, 
FGLS estimators in a random effects model will be efficient and asymptotically normal, so that the usual 
test statistics can be applied.   9
 
Table 1: Descriptions of all Variables included in the Random Effects Models Estimating the Effects of 
Openness on BOD and CO2 Emission Levels while Controlling for National Characteristics. 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
BOD  Organic Water Pollutant Emissions (kg per day). 
CO2  Carbon Dioxide Emissions (kt per year). 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product per Capita (Constant 1995 US$). 
GDP2  Square of GDP.  Included to capture non-linear effects of per capita income growth on 
emissions. 
Trade  Trade (% of GDP).  Included as a proxy for openness. 
Polity  The degree to which a country is either democratic or autocratic, as indicated by the 
Polity IV index (-10 = strongly autocratic; +10 = strongly democratic). 
Pop  Total population. 
Land  Land area (Square km). 
Urban  Urban population (as a % of total population). 
Disrupt 
Variable created to capture the years in which a country was coded by the Polity IV 
project as having had a disruption in governance (1 = coded for disruption; 0 = no 
disruption, regular polity index applies). 
Respond  Interaction term capturing the specific effects of GDP per capita for countries coded as 
democratic (index ≥ 1) by the Polity IV project. 
Respond2  Interaction term capturing the specific non-linear effects of GDP per capita (i.e. GDP2) 
for countries coded as democratic (index ≥ 1) by the Polity IV project. 
ATrade  Interaction term capturing the specific effects of openness to trade (Trade) for countries 
coded as strongly autocratic (index ≤ -5) by the Polity IV project. 
Haven  Interaction term capturing the combined effects of GDP per capita (GDP) and openness 
to trade (Trade). 
1 Dependent Variables = BOD / CO2. 
2 Model for BOD includes observations on 119 countries over 16 years (1980-1995). 
3 Model for CO2 includes observations on 143 countries over 31 years (1970-2000). 
  The effect of openness on environmental quality will be given by the coefficient 
on the variable Trade.  The quadratic term GDP2 is included in order to capture any non-
linearity in the effects of income per capita on environmental quality.  An EKC would 
thus be indicated by a positive coefficient on GDP coupled with a negative coefficient on 
GDP2.  The coefficient on the variable Polity will describe the direct effect of a country’s 
governance on its environmental quality, but of greater interest for the purposes of this 
paper will be the estimators on the terms interacting governance with openness, ATrade, 
and with income: Respond and Respond2.  Drawing from the economic literature 
discussed above, the interaction ATrade is included in order to test the hypothesis that 
openness will affect the environment differently in more autocratic countries than in more 
democratic ones.  Respond and Respond2 are included in order to test the hypothesis that 
democratic countries will be more responsive to increased demands for environmental  
   10
 
quality as per capita incomes grow, indicating a stronger technique effect from trade.  
Finally, again based on the economic theory developed earlier, a third interaction term 
Haven is also included in the model.  Haven is estimated in order to test the hypothesis of 
a pollution haven effect between relatively rich and poor countries.
13  The random effects 
models to be estimated therefore take the following form: 
BODit = μ + β1GDPit + β2GDP2it + β3Tradeit + β4Polityit + β5Popit + β6Landit + β7Urbanit                (3) 
                              + β8Disruptit + β9Respondit + β10Respond2it + β11ATradeit + β12Havenit + αi + εit  
 CO2it = μ + β1GDPit + β2GDP2it + β3Tradeit + β4Polityit + β5Popit + β6Landit + β7Urbanit     (4) 
 + β8Disruptit+ β9Respondit + β10Respond2it + β11ATradeit + β12Havenit + αi + εit    
where i again represents the country and t the year. 
  Initial estimates of models (3) and (4) were run and the results are summarized by 
Table B:1 in Appendix B.  Since Verbeek (2004) identifies that the use of goodness of 
fit measures is rather uncommon in panel data applications, we instead test our random 
effects model specification using the Hausman test.
14  The Hausman test evaluates the 
consistency of the random effects feasible GLS estimators by testing the null hypothesis 
that xit and αi are not correlated.
15  The random effects model with BOD as the dependent 
variable generates a Hausman test statistic of 254.83, which with 12 degrees of freedom 
rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level of significance.  Similarly, the model with CO2 
as the regressand generates a Hausman test statistic of 97.85 which again with 12 degrees 
of freedom leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level.  
Rejecting the null hypothesis in each case suggests that the xit and αi are correlated in 
both random effects models.  This is problematic since it also suggests that the 
coefficients estimated with the random effects method will be inconsistent. 
  The potential correlation between the xit and αi in our random effects models can 
be corrected by deriving instrumental variable estimators.  Hausman and Taylor (1981)  
 
                                                 
13 This approach to testing the pollution haven hypothesis is the same as that applied by Frankel and Rose 
(2005). 
14 The main reason that goodness of fit measures are generally not applied to panel data models is that the 
usual R
2 and adjusted R
2 indicators are only appropriate if the model is estimated with OLS (Verbeek, 
2004). 
15 Correlation between xit and αi violates the random effects model’s assumption that αi ~ IID(0, σα
2), which 
is required for the FGLS estimator to be both consistent and efficient.   11
 
 
show that this can be accomplished by instrumenting the correlated variables by their  
value in deviation from the individual (or in our case country) specific means.  Thus,  
while the exogenous variables x1,it  serve as their own instruments, the variables 
correlated with αi  (referred to as x2,it ) are instrumented as x2,it – x2 i .  These new 
instrumental variable estimators, referred to as the Hausman-Taylor estimators, are by 
construction uncorrelated with αi .   
  This Hausman-Taylor approach is advantageous since it does not require the 
adoption of external instruments (Verbeek, 2004).  However, deriving instruments within 
the model will require the researcher to impose their own assumptions about which 
variables are correlated with αi.  By inspecting the data sets, it is found that the maximum 
observations for both the GDP per capita and population data significantly diverge from 
the much lower mean and median values of the sample.
16  Moreover, these outlying 
values are observed for relatively few countries.  Therefore, hypothesizing that the these 
large outlying observations for GDP per capita and total population are driving the 
correlation between the xit and αi in our models, the variables Pop, GDP, and GDP2, as 
well as those interacted with GDP per capita: Respond, Respond2, and Haven, are 
instrumented using the Hausman-Taylor technique.   
 
4.0. Results 
  By regressing the dependent variables BOD and CO2 on our newly derived 
instrumental variables, we obtain consistent Hausman and Taylor estimators to which test 
statistics can be applied and inferences drawn concerning the hypothesized relationships 
between openness and environmental quality.  Results for the Hausman and Taylor 







                                                 
16 To demonstrate this observation, scatter plots of both the GDP per capita and population data are 
provided in Appendix B.   12
Table 2: Hausman and Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimators for Panel Data Models Estimating the 
Effects of Openness on BOD and CO2 Emission Levels while Controlling for National Characteristics. 
VARIABLE  REGRESSAND = BOD 
(MODEL 3) 
REGRESSAND = CO2 
(MODEL 4) 




















































    
# Countries  N = 119  N = 143 
Years  1980 - 1995  1970 – 2000 
1 Standard errors provided in parentheses. 
2 * indicates significance at the 5% level or better 
3 ** indicates significance at the 10% level or better 
4 The panel data in this study required the application of unbalanced panel estimation techniques. 
  A few notes on specification deserve mention.  The interactive term ATrade was 
initially specified to interact the effects of openness with countries that were ranked 
lower than zero by the polity index, thus capturing the specific impacts of freer trade for 
autocratic versus democratic countries.  However, t-tests on the initial estimates for both 
models found this variable to be insignificant in explaining variation in either BOD or 
CO2 emission levels.  An alternate hypothesis was thus formulated to test if strongly 
autocratic countries reacted differently to trade liberalization than weakly autocratic or 
democratic countries.  ATrade was therefore re-specified to interact the effects of 
openness with countries ranked -5 or lower by the polity index, and it is these results that   13
are summarized by Table 2.
17  A similar test was conducted for the two Response 
variables, however the results of increasing incomes for strongly democratic countries 
(ranked higher that +5 on the polity index) were not found to be significantly different 
from those for all democratic countries.  Consequently, the more general result is taken to 
provide greater insight, and both Response and Response2 in Table 2 capture the 
interaction between per capita GDP and those countries ranked above zero on the polity 
scale. 
 
  4.1. Estimated Effects for Organic Water Pollutant (BOD) Emissions 
  Several inferences can be drawn from the estimated effects of the instrumental 
variables on the dependent variable BOD (Model 3).  First of all, considering the direct 
effect of freer trade on emission levels, we can see that the variable Trade is significant at 
the 5% level, leading us to reject the null hypothesis that increased openness does not 
affect environmental quality across countries.  Moreover, the positive coefficient on 
Trade indicates that water quality, as reflected by BOD emissions, will be worse in more 
open economies, ceteris paribus.   
  However, when the estimator on the interaction variable ATrade is considered in 
addition to the results for Trade, an interesting picture emerges.  The positive coefficient 
and small standard error on ATrade suggest that the environmental effects of openness to 
trade will be significantly different in strongly autocratic countries versus democratic or 
even weakly autocratic countries.
18  Moreover, the magnitude of the ATrade estimator, in 
comparison to the marginal effects on Trade, suggests that the increase in emissions for 
strongly autocratic countries will be empirically significant as well.  Therefore, to the 
extent that an EKC for BOD emissions is observable, strongly autocratic governance will 
cause an upward shift in emissions for any given level of per capita income, meaning a 
                                                 
17 Upon re-specifying the variable ATrade to capture the effects of strongly autocratic countries only, an 
additional interaction term was added to each model to test the additional hypothesis that openness affects 
the environment differently in strongly democratic countries, compared to either weakly autocratic or 
weakly democratic countries.  This additional interactive variable was found to be insignificant in both 
models, leading us to fail to reject the null that strongly democratic countries react similarly to freer trade 
as weakly autocratic or weakly democratic countries.  This variable was therefore dropped from the 
specification in order to highlight the effects of openness on strongly autocratic versus all other kinds of 
governance, as captured by ATrade. 
18 As discussed above, ATrade specifies “strongly” autocratic countries as those ranked -5 or lower on the 
Polity IV governance index.   14
higher peak in the EKC and greater degradation before environmental improvements 
occur. 
  To investigate the EKC hypothesis further, we must look at the estimators for the 
income per capita variables.  The positive coefficient on GDP coupled with the negative 
coefficient for GDP2 indicate that a representative country in our sample will follow an 
EKC path of BOD emissions as per capita income levels grow.  However, while the 
estimated effect for GDP is highly significant, the large standard error and relatively 
small marginal effect for GDP2 suggest that the downward sloping portion of the EKC 
might not be empirically significant.   
  Extending this analysis to test the hypothesis that increased incomes will lead to 
similar environmental quality responses in both democratic and autocratic countries, we 
next consider the estimators for Respond and Respond2 in combination with the GDP per 
capita coefficients.   The negative, strongly significant coefficient on Respond indicates 
democratic governance reduces the increases in BOD emissions that will result from per 
capita income growth.  Moreover, the magnitude of this estimator for Respond, in 
comparison to that for GDP, suggests that the marginal effect of an increase in per capita 
income will be significantly reduced for democratic countries not only statistically, but 
also empirically.  We thus reject the null hypothesis that democratic and autocratic 
countries will be equally responsive to demands for environmental quality when per 
capita incomes grow.  However, we also observe that the quadratic term Respond2, like 
GDP2, appears both statistically and empirically insignificant.  This again suggests that 
non-linear effects of income growth on BOD emissions may not be observable, and thus 
casts doubt on the EKC hypothesis. 
  These results for the regression of BOD on our instrumental variables are depicted 
in Figure 1 below.  The more gradual slope for the strongly democratic country reflects 
the significant impact of the Respond variable, which reduces the marginal effect of 
increasing per capita incomes on BOD emissions.  The upward shift in the emissions path 
for strongly autocratic countries, resulting from the significantly different effects of 
openness on these countries as suggested by the estimator on ATrade, is also readily 
apparent. 
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        Figure 1:Predicted BOD Emission Levels for Countries with Different Types of  























































Average Polity Strongly Autocratic Strongly Democratic
 
        1 Average polity provided as a base case: Polity = 0. 
        2 Strongly Autocratic: Polity = - 5. 
        3 Strongly Democratic: Polity = + 5. 
  To depict the relationships in Figure 1, all control variables are entered at their 
mean values; except for the dummy variable Disrupt which is included at its mode.  Of 
interest, both higher total population levels, as indicated by Pop, and a higher percentage 
of urban as opposed to rural population, indicated by Urban, are found to significantly 
increase BOD emissions across countries.  Meanwhile, a higher total land area, captured 
through Land, is found to reduce BOD emissions, suggesting that a country’s population 
density may be significant in explaining organic water pollutants. 
 
  4.2. Estimated Effects for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions 
  Interpreting the estimated effects of the instrumental variables on the dependent 
variable CO2 (Model 4) yields some interesting comparisons.  The variable Trade has a 
positive coefficient, indicating that CO2 emissions increase with openness to trade, and 
the small standard error on this estimator again lead us to reject the null hypothesis that 
increased openness does not affect environmental quality across countries.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
19 Depictions for countries of average or strongly autocratic governance types are cut off at a per capita 
GDP of $15,000.00 because the BOD dataset does not support observations beyond this point.   16
the variable Polity is weakly significant in this model, and its negative estimator indicates 
that an increase in the democracy level of a country (or lessening of autocracy) will 
marginally decrease emissions of CO2.
20  However, the inclusion of ATrade, which 
interacts the effects of these two variables, is now found to be insignificant in explaining 
variations in air quality across countries.  Therefore, while finding that both freer trade 
and governance significantly explain differences in CO2 emissions, ceteris paribus, we 
also fail to reject the null hypothesis that openness affects the environment similarly in 
autocratic and democratic countries. 
  Investigating the model further, we find a positive coefficient on the GDP 
variable and a negative coefficient on the GDP2 variable, again indicating a possible 
EKC path for the relationship between emissions and income per capita.  Moreover, 
unlike the estimators for BOD, both the linear and non-linear terms are now statistically 
significant, lending credibility to the hypothesis of reduced CO2 emissions at higher 
levels of income per capita.  However, a curious result is obtained when the Respond and 
Repsond2 variables are considered in conjunction with these results.  The insignificance 
and relatively small magnitude of the estimator on Respond suggests that there is little 
difference between democratic and autocratic countries regarding the linear effects of 
income per capita on emissions.   The non-linear terms describe a different story, though.  
Here, the positive coefficient and statistically significant effect of the Respond2 term 
directly counteracts the marginal effect of the GDP2 estimator.  Moreover, the similar 
magnitude of these two estimators indicates that for democratic versus autocratic 
countries, the non-linear component of the EKC will be almost entirely reversed. 
  These results for the regression of CO2 on our instrumental variables are depicted 
in Figure 2 below.  Since ATrade does not significantly explain any variation in this 
model, we no longer observe an upward shift in the CO2 Emissions – Income per Capita 
curve for strongly autocratic countries as opposed to all other governance levels.  
Consequently, only two emissions paths are needed to explain the observed relationships: 
one for democratic countries, one for autocratic countries.  The curve for autocratic 
countries clearly displays the effects of both the GDP and GDP2 estimators, as we see it  
                                                 
20 The magnitude of the estimators on both Trade and Polity indicate good economic significance for their 
respective marginal effects as well.   17
 
begin to bend back down at higher per capita income levels.  The more linear emissions 
path for democratic countries reflects the interaction of the GDP2 and Respond2 marginal 
effects.   
        Figure 2: Predicted CO2 Emission Levels for Countries with Different Types of  


































































































Strongly Democratic Strongly Autocratic
 
        1 Strongly Democratic: Polity = + 5. 
        2 Strongly Autocratic: Polity = - 5. 
  To depict the relationships in Figure 2, all control variables are again entered at 
their mean values, except for the dummy variable Disrupt which is included at its mode.  
Total population levels (Pop) are again found to significantly increase CO2 emissions 
across countries.  The estimator on Land remains significant but becomes positive in this 
model, suggesting that the larger a country’s land area, the higher its emissions of CO2.  
This may reflect a need to regularly travel greater distances in large countries, thus 
producing more pollution.  The percentage of urban population (Urban) is insignificant in 
explaining CO2 emissions, but the dummy variable Disrupt is now significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that the occurrence of a disruption in governance will increase emissions 
of CO2 in the destabilized country. 
 
                                                 
21 The depiction for strongly autocratic countries is cut off at a GDP per capita of $20,000.00 because the 
CO2 dataset does not support observations beyond this point.   18
  4.3. The Pollution Haven Effect 
   The hypothesis of a pollution haven effect between relatively rich and poor 
countries is tested by including the variable Haven in each model.  As discussed earlier, 
the pollution haven effect hypothesizes that relatively rich countries, which experience 
greater demand for environmental quality, may enact more stringent environmental 
regulation while taking advantage of trade and allowing poorer open countries produce 
and sell products with high emissions.  A negative coefficient on the Haven variable, 
which interacts GDP (income) with Trade (openness), would thus indicate that rich 
countries are utilizing trade to transfer pollution intensive activities outside their 
borders.
22 
  The estimators on the Haven variables in each model are, indeed, negative.  
Moreover, this effect is strongly significant in the CO2 model and weakly so in the BOD 
model.  We therefore fail to reject the hypothesis of a pollution haven effect between 
relatively rich and poor open economies.  Depictions of these effects are provided in 
Figures 3 and 4 below. 
       Figure 3: Pollution haven effects for BOD emissions considering relatively rich vs.  
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Democratic & Poor Democratic & Rich
Autocratic & Poor Autocratic & Rich
 
        1 Rich countries are depicted with GDP per capita = $15,000.00 
        2 Poor countries are depicted with GDP per capita = $500.00 
        3 Democratic countries displayed at an index value of Polity = + 5. 
        4 Autocratic countries displayed at an index value of Polity = - 5. 
                                                 
22 The development of these ideas and test method closely follow the work of Frankel and Rose (2005).   19
       Figure 4: Pollution haven effects for CO2 emissions considering relatively rich vs.  
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Democratic & Poor Democratic & Rich
Autocratic & Poor Autocratic & Rich
 
        1 Rich countries are depicted with GDP per capita = $15,000.00 
        2 Poor countries are depicted with GDP per capita = $500.00 
        3 Democratic countries displayed at an index value of Polity = + 5. 
        4 Autocratic countries displayed at an index value of Polity = - 5. 
  Interpreting the results in Figures 3 and 4 provides some interesting insights.
23  
To begin, as reflected by the negative coefficients on the Haven variables, we see that in 
both models emissions increase as poor countries become more open to trade, but tend to 
decrease with greater openness in rich countries.  In general, these observations support 
the potential for a pollution haven effect.  The one exception to this trend is for relatively 
rich, autocratic countries in Figure 3 (the BOD model), where emissions appear to stay 
relatively constant as openness increases.   
  This anomaly can be accounted for by drawing on the observations in Figure 1.  
Recall that when estimating BOD emissions, autocratic countries were observed to 
experience higher emissions over all per capita income levels due to the positive, 
significant effect of the variable ATrade.  Since ATrade captures the specific effect of 
increasing openness for strongly autocratic countries, its marginal effect increases as we 
                                                 
23 Of note, Figures 3 and 4 are shown with relatively rich countries assumed to have a per capita GDP of 
$15,000.00, while relatively poor countries are assumed to be at $500.00.  These assumptions provide the 
largest divergence between rich and poor possible while remaining within observational limits of the 
dataset.  Meanwhile, Polity values of (+ 5, - 5) are chosen as they reflect the mid-point values on both the 
democratic and autocratic sides of the Polity IV governance index.   20
move along the x-axis in Figure 3.  Consequently, BOD emissions increase for autocratic 
countries as free trade increases, which likely negates any decline in emissions that 
results from a pollution haven effect.  Moreover, this effect could also explain the steeper 
slope for poor, autocratic nations compared to the poor democratic ones in Figure 3.  The 
increased BOD emissions from the pollution haven effect are augmented for poor, 
strongly autocratic countries by further increases in emissions due to the more open 
economy as we move along the x-axis.  These explanations for the different slopes 
observed in Figure 3 are supported by the results in Figure 4, where the lack of a 
significant coefficient on ATrade for CO2 emissions generates parallel effects of 
increased openness for democratic and autocratic countries at the same income level. 
 
5.0. Discussion 
  In the models estimated above, we find a ceteris paribus effect in which freer 
trade significantly increases emissions of both BOD and CO2.  However, the panel data 
used in this study allows heterogeneity between nations to be controlled, so that 
comparisons of how national characteristics influence the impact of freer trade on the 
environment can be made.  According to Frankel and Rose (2005: 85), analysis of how 
country specific effects influence this relationship may be the most fundamental issue for 
policy, since; “if it is established that trade has an adverse effect on the environment 
solely because openness raises countries’ incomes, …, not many would choose deliberate 
self-impoverishment as a means to a clean environment.” 
  The model predicting BOD emissions suggests that encouraging more democratic 
governance may help to mediate the increasing emissions that arise with openness to 
trade.  Interacting governance with income levels, it is observed that democratic 
governments can induce significant reductions in pollution as income levels rise.  This 
may reflect the technique effect proposed by Copeland and Taylor (2004).  Moreover, the 
interaction of governance and openness finds that strongly autocratic governments lead to 
an upward shift in an emissions path, so that pollution is higher at any given income level 
for open countries.  This result is supported by the argument of Damania et al (2003) and 
Welsch (2004) that corrupt governance can reduce environmental quality by failing to 
enforce regulations such as emission limits.  These observations could be interpreted to   21
suggest that the promotion of democracy will improve the relationship between trade 
liberalization and environmental quality. 
  The results from the model predicting CO2 emission levels are more troubling, 
however.  In line with the arguments of Cole et al (1997), we find that for democratic 
countries CO2 emissions, as a purely global externality, appear to increase almost 
monotonically with income, and thus with trade.   These effects appear to be moderated 
for autocratic countries, though, where the data suggests the possibility of an EKC as per 
capita incomes increase.  It is thus unclear how to interpret these results, as it makes little 
sense to suggest promoting autocracy as a means for reducing CO2 emissions.  
Alternatively, Welsch (2004) suggests that we may be observing an indirect effect of 
governance on environmental quality, through which corruption reduces prosperity, 
thereby reducing per capita income levels.  The result of this effect is to reduce emissions 
for poor countries on the upward sloping portion of an Emissions-Income curve.  Still, 
further research into the relationship between trade and purely global externalities, such 
as CO2, is clearly needed.  One potential avenue is proposed by Copeland and Taylor 
(2005), who find that international agreements reducing pollutants, such as the Kyoto 
Accord, may be more efficient under conditions of free trade in goods. 
  Finally, the results from testing for the pollution haven effect also provide some 
cause for concern.  Analyzing these effects indicates that relatively rich countries may be 
experiencing improved environmental quality through reduced emissions associated with 
openness to trade.  These improvements are reflected by the downward sloping emissions 
paths as rich countries become more open to trade in Figures 3 and 4.
24  However, by 
failing to reject the pollution haven hypothesis, it is suggested that these environmental 
gains may be coming at the expense of environmental degradation in poorer countries.  
Emissions would thus not be reduced, but instead shifted outside of rich countries to 
poorer “pollution havens”.  The transferability of the environmental improvements that 
rich, developed countries appear to experience through trade liberalization is thus called 
into question, since currently developing countries may not be able to shift emissions 
outside their borders in the same way. 
                                                 
24 As previously discussed, the only relatively rich group of countries that did not reduce emissions as 
openness increased were the strongly autocratic countries in Figure 3.   22
6.0. Conclusion 
  The purpose of this paper was to report an empirical study into the effects of trade 
liberalization on the environment.  Econometric models are estimated to predict the 
effects of openness on organic water pollutant (BOD) and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions, and both models find that freer trade significantly increases emissions, thus 
reducing environmental quality.  However, the panel data used in this study allowed 
inferences to be drawn beyond these ceteris paribus effects of trade liberalization.  By 
controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity between countries, several additional 
observations are made regarding how national characteristics influence the impact of 
freer trade on the environment. 
  To acquire these results, initial estimates of models regressing both BOD and 
CO2 emissions were conducted with the random effects approach to panel data.  The 
random effects model was chosen for estimation due to the desire to identify differences 
in emission levels across countries with certain national characteristics.  Applying the 
Hausman test, however, it was found that the observed values of the explanatory 
variables were correlated with the country specific, randomly distributed error terms, thus 
violating one of the key assumptions for consistency of the random effects estimator.  
Accordingly, instrumental variables were introduced by transforming the dataset 
following Hausman and Taylor (1981).  The resulting Hausman and Taylor estimators, 
consistent and uncorrelated with the country-specific errors by definition, were thus used 
to derive and analyze our results.  Finally, given the size and nature of our dataset 
(spanning 31 years and 143 countries for CO2; 16 years and 119 countries for BOD) 
unobserved values were unavoidable.  The flexibility of the random effects model and 
Hausman and Taylor estimators to adjust to unbalanced datasets was thus essential to the 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Information 
 
Table A:1: Descriptive Information for the BOD Dataset:   
Mean Variable Values and Number of Years Observed for Each Country. 




Observed  BOD GDP Land Polity Pop Trade  Urban  Disrupt
1 6  20422.9  789.702  27400  -0.33333  3.23E+06  47.8882  37.1167 0.000 
2  13  100055  1644.85 2.38E+06 -6.46154 2.42E+07 48.2119 50.3385 0.000 
3 3  3253.45  554.889  1.25E+06  -5  9.99E+06  101.965  27.5333 -5.000 
4 14  210984  6895.87  2.74E+06  4.14286  3.10E+07  15.7978  85.645 0.000 
5 5  19755.3  490.771  28200  6.2  3.43E+06  101.692  66.366 0.000 
6 16  173406  17969.4  7.68E+06  10  1.64E+07  34.4326  85.8388 0.000 
7 16  94743.1  25691.5  82730  10  7.68E+06  74.429  65.6413 0.000 
8 3  47415.7  596.603  86600  -1.66667  7.49E+06  142.647  52.78 0.000 
9 14  116700  269.352  130170  -3.07143  1.01E+08  19.9286  18.1057 0.000 
10 14  120549  23554.8  30278  10  9.92E+06  134.641  96.0507 0.000 
11 2  1800.02  374.87  110620  -7  3.51E+06  56.514  27.685 0.000 
12 16  8262.63  872.611  1.08E+06  6.8125  6.29E+06  47.736  52.815 0.000 
13 16  3074.92  2501.9  566730  7.5625  1.18E+06  108.985  34.5631 0.000 
14 11  773708  4055.16  8.46E+06  2.72727  1.40E+08  18.7828  72.0782 0.000 
15 16  138059  1568.18  110550  -1.375  8.78E+06  82.1063  65.0981 0.000 
16 4  2423.04  220.815  273600  -7  7.23E+06  39.5507  9.35 0.000 
17 8  1298.73  199.442  25680  -7  5.00E+06  35.0901  5.6225 0.000 
18 12  15677  755.354  465400  -6.58333  1.11E+07  48.8608  38.3458 0.000 
19 16  311417  18191.2  9.22E+06  10  2.69E+07  55.3413  76.5444 0.000 
20 13  904.224  377.781  622980  -5.92308  2.75E+06  47.7275  36.7177 0.000 
21 16  56476.2  3143.87  748800  0.25  1.26E+07  55.3881  82.8938 0.000 
22  16  5.43E+06 326.444 9.33E+06  -7  1.09E+09 27.9723 25.3088 0.000 
23 16  96642.1  2046.93  1.04E+06  8.1875  3.34E+07  30.8075  67.0781 0.000 
24 8  2056.99  922.577  341500  -8  2.09E+06  105.319  45.1712 0.000 
25 12  27181.4  2993.71  51060  10  3.00E+06  71.7998  53.335 0.000 
26 6  13250.1  1004.71  318000  -8  1.03E+07  74.6848  37.5483 0.000 
27 5  60254.6  3996.77  55920  -3.4  4.75E+06  112.672  55.082 0.000 
28 16  6872.93  9005.73  9240  10  667625  105.961  61.1269 0.000 
29 2  283941  4975.19  77280  8  1.03E+07  93.1488  75.15 0.000 
30 16  74195.4  30642.9  42395.6  10  5.14E+06  67.192  84.4969 0.000 
31 6  54053.1  1334.97  48380  6  6.07E+06  47.758  52.575 0.000 
32 16  25336.2  1741.28  276840  8.75  9.68E+06  55.0845  52.8575 0.000 
33 16  193023  901.262  995450  -4.3125  4.95E+07  57.0366  43.5275 0.000 
34 10  8215.78  1463.18  20720  4  5.00E+06  55.2376  48.227 0.000 
35 2  45.145  333.521  28050  -7  344000  106.909  33.005 0.000 
36 15  19511.6  106.5  1.00E+06  -6  4.78E+07  25.4647  12.276 -0.933 
37 14  4226.09  2265.4  18270  5.28571  704786  101.802  40.0179 0.000 
38 16  80139.1  23886.7  304590  10  4.94E+06  55.8226  60.6125 0.000 
39 16  659215  24205.8  550100  8.625  5.59E+07  43.3206  73.9406 0.000 
40  7  2145.91 4616.72 257670 -5.42857 949143 90.7721 66.44 0.000   25
41 4  695.832  369.835  10000  7.5  756750  113.501  21.5425 0.000 
42 5  845025  29527  348950  10  8.10E+07  48.5394  86.02 0.000 
43 11  13590.1  338.334  227540  -4.18182  1.37E+07  31.5725  34.4018 0.000 
44 16  62512.9  10669.5  128900  9.25  1.01E+07  46.6204  58.5831 0.000 
45 14  18394.9  1413.18  108430  -0.53571  8.24E+06  37.4609  40.0736 -0.107 
46 3  14130.5  788.814  196850  -7  761667  153.008  30.8 0.000 
47 9  5151.51  562.818  27560  -8.55556  5.77E+06  44.8843  25.8511 -1.778 
48 16  19034.3  695.466  111890  5.3125  4.55E+06  65.5834  38.8462 0.313 
49 16  177631  4531.81  92341.3  0.375  1.05E+07  73.4631  60.4569 0.250 
50  16  1.42E+06 294.213 2.97E+06  8.0625  8.08E+08 16.0323 24.8906 0.000 
51 16  421660  714.968  1.81E+06  -7  1.71E+08  49.1479  28.5219 0.000 
52  14  94186.3  1370.63 1.64E+06 -6.28571 4.89E+07 26.9383  54.175 -1.143 
53 16  37106.2  13528.7  68890  10  3.52E+06  112.326  56.6044 0.000 
54 16  46634  13567.9  20620  9  4.56E+06  88.1305  89.9112 0.000 
55 16  394474  16838.6  294110  10  5.67E+07  42.3368  66.7787 0.000 
56 13  15929.7  1962.17  10830  9.76923  2.36E+06  103.809  50.3915 0.000 
57 16  1.50E+06  35542  365031  10  1.22E+08  21.0945  61.9188 0.000 
58 16  8229.15  1724.63  88930  -6.5625  3.04E+06  122.892  69.2787 0.000 
59 16  38302.3  335.693  569140  -6.25  2.16E+07  58.1211  22.6275 0.000 
60 16  334166  7189.3  98730  0.65625  4.17E+07  62.7207  68.6825 0.031 
61 14  8486.01  11931.7  17820  -8.42857  1.68E+06  98.6987  93.9029 0.000 
62 4  26308  530.083  191800  -3  4.53E+06  75.919  36.865 0.000 
63 5  33253.5  2206.22  62050  8  2.59E+06  106.094  69.29 0.000 
64 8  1788.13  420.573  30350  -3.25  1.50E+06  136.123  16.405 0.000 
65 3  50522.4  2204.28  64800  10  3.68E+06  110.985  67.4067 0.000 
66 5  27149.4  2455.96  25430  6  1.94E+06  84.0628  58.954 0.000 
67 9  11990.9  288.369  581540  -6  9.89E+06  34.167  20.54 0.000 
68 16  9539.94  147.823  94080  -6.9375  7.80E+06  58.2758  11.0369 0.000 
69 16  97974.9  2994.35  328550  3.9375  1.70E+07  131.682  48.2269 0.000 
70 16  14875.3  2494.89  2030  9.875  1.04E+06  115.942  41.3162 0.000 
71 16  175869  3232.63  1.91E+06  -1  7.94E+07  33.3987  70.5869 0.000 
72 5  42631  641.635  32910  6.2  4.35E+06  118.86  46.45 0.000 
73  15  10594.5  434.757 1.57E+06 -1.53333 2.02E+06 110.091  55.666 0.000 
74 16  49235.2  1222.17  446300  -7.75  2.29E+07  54.6652  46.6125 0.000 
75 3  22183.3  129.256  784090  -6.66667  1.42E+07  47.6051  20.92 0.000 
76 9  23980.5  185.205  143000  1.11111  1.78E+07  36.3055  8.83667 0.000 
77 16  139235  23362.4  33880  10  1.48E+07  105.778  59.6362 0.000 
78 16  54567.3  15250.9  267990  10  3.37E+06  57.8522  84.2725 0.000 
79 6  10862.2  650.678  121400  -3.91667  3.16E+06  50.9226  50.97 -1.083 
80 3  305.083  321.049  1.27E+06  -7  5.77E+06  60.0473  12.93 0.000 
81 11  64314.8  255.439  910770  -1.45455  8.98E+07  58.311  32.8545 0.000 
82 16  57487.9  27915.8  306830  10  4.21E+06  73.3388  71.7475 0.000 
83 10  1436.31  5539.92  309500  -9.5  1.74E+06  85.3919  60.946 0.000 
84 12  91628.7  392.755  770880  -1.25  9.63E+07  34.9678  29.4525 0.000 
85 15  9484.64  2778.8  74430  -0.46667  2.26E+06  75.1999  52.7 0.000 
86 10  5303.96  832.719  452860  10  3.48E+06  94.3954  13.105 0.000 
87 15  52159.4  2288.48  1.28E+06  5.66667  2.04E+07  32.6675  67.6707 0.000   26
88 16  167214  1080.2  298170  1.9375  5.78E+07  57.6098  45.8506 0.063 
89 6  403516  2984.64  304408  7.66667  3.84E+07  47.2776  61.0117 0.000 
90 16  116483  8834.33  91500  9.875  9.92E+06  65.7081  41.1662 0.000 
91 5  370717  1483.76  230340  5  2.29E+07  49.7807  53.89 0.000 
92  3  1.80E+06 2876.45 1.69E+07  4  1.48E+08 58.2786  73.36 0.000 
93 3  2093.98  312.714  24670  -7  6.05E+06  31.9015  5.01 0.000 
94 3  20364.4  9959.89  2.15E+06  -10  1.40E+07  80.1456  74.7967 0.000 
95 16  9346.04  558.23  192530  -1.0625  6.88E+06  65.9927  39.1237 0.000 
96 3  2633.29  316.635  71620  -7  3.65E+06  49.2498  27.2667 0.000 
97  4  69544 3421.1 48800  7  5.32E+06  117.971  56.645 3.500 
98 3  42508.3  9063.44  20120  10  1.98E+06  114.667  50.77 0.000 
99 16  249742  4206.28  1.22E+06  5.125  3.33E+07  47.9298  49.2537 0.875 
100 16  325995  12647.9  499444  9.875  3.85E+07  38.1167  74.6094 0.000 
101 16  54119.4  585.836  64630  5.125  1.59E+07  70.3366  21.3669 0.000 
102  16  3328.51  1304.86 17200  -9.8125 719938  159.885  21.6406 0.000 
103 16  112605  26060.6  411620  10  8.49E+06  61.3749  83.11 0.000 
104 10  137488  43907.6  39550  10  6.76E+06  69.5099  67.065 0.000 
105 16  23780.2  707.486  183780  -9  1.13E+07  51.9068  48.36 0.000 
106 4  31766.4  182.254  883590  -5.25  2.75E+07  54.389  24.3 0.000 
107 9  264245  1840.42  510890  3.55556  5.42E+07  66.8452  28.9567 0.000 
108 5  1041.69  413.531  54390  -7  2.69E+06  102.447  24.35 0.000 
109 5  34846  1858.99  155360  -5.2  7.87E+06  90.3153  57.104 0.000 
110 16  167500  2372.04  769630  5.4375  5.31E+07  31.8292  54.7475 0.000 
111 6  6831.3  232.581  197100  -4.5  1.53E+07  26.9168  10.2917 -0.333 
112 5  623500  1343.53  579350  6  5.20E+07  63.8548  66.872 0.000 
113 16  753899  16673.6  240880  10  5.72E+07  52.0328  88.5419 0.000 
114  16  2.56E+06 24371.2 9.16E+06  10  2.44E+08 19.7559 75.1219 0.000 
115 16  31975.4  5193.61  175020  4.4375  3.06E+06  40.7585  88.0387 0.000 
116 16  90352  3563.58  882050  8.75  1.84E+07  48.6054  82.7763 0.000 
117 6  7584.31  261.712  527970  -2  1.39E+07  77.7712  22.4383 -1.000 
118 5  13791.4  529.871  743390  -6  6.85E+06  73.2059  39.29 0.000 
119 16  35893.6  625.946  386850  -2.1875  9.38E+06  50.6096  27.1162 0.000 
1 Dataset includes observations for 119 countries over maximum range of 16 years (1980-1995). 
2 Countries not observed in all years of the dataset still provide efficiency in model estimation 
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Table A:2: Descriptive Information for the CO2 Dataset:   
Mean Variable Values and Number of Years Observed for Each Country. 




Observed  CO2 GDP Land Polity Pop Trade  Urban Disrupt
1 21  4846.91  845.228  27400  -2.28571  3.07E+06  46.4639  36.9529  0.000 
2  31  64470.7  1573.78 2.38E+06 -6.96774 2.20E+07 54.8342 47.6645  0.000 
3 15  5573.16  590.592  1.25E+06  -5.26667  1.02E+07  105.55  27.8733  -1.667 
4  31  108733  7204.96 2.74E+06  2.06452  3.01E+07 15.9992 84.7181  0.000 
5 9  3155.11  507.763  28200  3  3.29E+06  86.8547  65.7989  0.000 
6  31  232814  17650.3 7.68E+06  10  1.59E+07 33.8904 86.3816  0.000 
7 31  56479.4  24474.5  82725.2  10  7.68E+06  72.9133  65.5642  0.000 
8 9  35238.3  497.235  86600  -4.88889  7.75E+06  100.802  51.82  0.000 
9 21  12652.8  9384.13  698.571  -9.61905  501619  180.786  88.1733  0.000 
10 29  12982.8  274.719  130170  -0.55172  9.99E+07  21.691  17.0414  0.000 
11 9  67708.7  1645.7  207480  -1.55556  1.01E+07  126.101  68.32  0.000 
12 31  111691  22928.2  30278  10  9.93E+06  127.756  95.7297  0.000 
13 31  687.425  365.232  110620  -2.27419  4.20E+06  47.1975  30.3661  -0.016 
14 21  171.824  376.622  47000  -8  620571  70.2449  5.61905  0.000 
15  31  5907.71  925.432 1.08E+06  2.96774  6.07E+06 49.6871 50.5281  0.000 
16  29  1783.48  2276.52  566730 7.62069  1.15E+06  110.412  31.2814 0.000 
17  31  193336  3927.2 8.46E+06 1.54839 1.34E+08  17.6235  69.7945  0.000 
18 21  68664.1  1536.49  110550  0.857143  8.65E+06  87.4585  65.8852  0.000 
19 31  574.184  227.65  273600  -4.5  8.06E+06  35.4712  11.0358  0.016 
20 31  146.087  177.682  25680  -6.16129  4.89E+06  31.8681  5.3829  -0.774 
21 8  549.143  326.611  176520  0.375  1.13E+07  78.344  15.0737  0.000 
22 31  3577.41  715.211  465400  -6.74194  1.04E+07  48.3447  35.5813  0.000 
23  31  407305  17545.9 9.22E+06  10  2.62E+07 56.5732 76.5997  0.000 
24 31  186.273  393.116  622980  -3.83871  2.69E+06  51.0954  36.1955  0.000 
25  31  148.332  225.026 1.26E+06 -6.08065 5.32E+06 43.4527 19.1829  -1.758 
26 31  32895.5  3197.74  748800  0.451613  1.22E+07  50.1066  81.7094  0.000 
27  31  2.00E+06 326.699 9.33E+06 -7.19355 1.05E+09 23.9913 24.3058  0.000 
28  31  47851.9  1954.24 1.04E+06  7.80645  3.19E+07 31.4815 65.7097  0.000 
29 21  57.4025  499.003  2230  -1.42857  437190  58.6773  28.0229  0.190 
30  31  3283.19  244.99 2.27E+06 -8.64516 3.34E+07 39.262 28.9016  -2.323 
31 29  1429.2  735.296  341500  -4.94828  2.20E+06  108.414  43.4731  -0.052 
32 31  3067.2  3015.61  51060  10  2.69E+06  74.4244  49.8226  0.000 
33 31  6200.73  1002.18  318000  -7.58065  1.02E+07  70.0318  36.8513  -0.032 
34 9  18548.4  4355.95  55920  -2.33333  4.58E+06  96.2028  56.1933  0.111 
35 25  3997.56  8789.44  9240  10  668720  104.634  59.6496  0.000 
36 9  123888  5035.28  77280  9.77778  1.03E+07  116.504  74.5511  0.000 
37 31  57242  29952.8  42393.2  10  5.14E+06  65.1195  83.6939  0.000 
38 6  373.117  781.091  23180  -3.5  624167  103.534  80.7233  0.000 
39 31  10027.4  1385.53  48380  3.93548  6.39E+06  57.2783  51.8868  0.000 
40 31  15533.9  1677.8  276840  5  9.14E+06  53.9824  50.5071  0.000 
41 31  65154.5  825.981  995450  -5.03226  4.71E+07  52.411  43.2242  0.000   28
42 31  2995.3  1583.63  20745.2  3.06452  4.87E+06  57.7082  47.4329  0.000 
43 14  171.424  443.923  28050  -6.14286  369786  133.258  36.2064  0.000 
44 8  364.109  166.596  101000  -6  3.73E+06  103.667  17.6112  0.000 
45 9  18966.5  3130.13  42270  6  1.43E+06  156.262  69.8711  0.000 
46 20  3042.59  107.76  1.00E+06  -4.25  5.12E+07  29.416  12.835  -0.700 
47  31  686.208  2288.52 18270  6.46774 679484  103.573  40.4255 0.177 
48 31  50630.7  22659.8  304590  10  4.90E+06  56.9438  59.28  0.000 
49 31  404092  23157.1  550100  8.48387  5.52E+07  42.0387  73.689  0.000 
50  31  4799.07 4838.55 257670 -7.30645 840871 96.2009  58.1065 -0.210 
51 31  160.862  358.393  10000  4.6129  812516  104.43  21.7484  0.000 
52 9  6413.63  657.504  69490  4.66667  5.34E+06  81.2796  53.6256  0.000 
53 10  837300  30421.9  348950  10  8.15E+07  52.8955  86.575  0.000 
54 31  3590.94  378.293  227540  -2.98387  1.34E+07  42.7303  34.5965  -0.145 
55  31  59397.5  10487.5  128900 6.79032  9.82E+06  43.4313  57.6013 0.016 
56 31  4822.14  1418.38  108430  0.66129  7.94E+06  41.0315  39.661  -0.048 
57 15  1118.01  550.857  245720  -4.06667  6.26E+06  50.7752  27.5347  0.000 
58 27  412.839  217.273  28120  -4.03704  967815  50.755  22.3252  0.370 
59  31  1476.95 774.781 196827 -0.70968 743258 162.019  32.1723 0.000 
60 31  829.837  495.82  27560  -5.08065  6.00E+06  39.7727  26.9158  -0.435 
61  31  2523.79  685.755  111890 3.48387  4.30E+06  72.0616  37.2968 0.161 
62 31  70848  4258.5  92328.7  -0.45161  1.04E+07  83.289  58.3394  0.129 
63  31  559291  291.438 2.97E+06  8.29032  7.72E+08 15.9161 24.0761  0.000 
64 31  129574  660.17  1.81E+06  -6.03226  1.63E+08  49.8085  27.2729  0.000 
65  27  193398  1548.23 1.64E+06 -5.62963 4.89E+07 37.8162 54.5781  -0.889 
66 31  27941.3  13767.3  68890  10  3.43E+06  112.434  55.9013  0.000 
67 31  32534  13141  20620  9.06452  4.41E+06  89.4591  88.9565  0.000 
68 31  368189  15870.7  294110  10  5.64E+07  42.8598  66.3955  0.000 
69 31  7672.78  2053.52  10830  9.74194  2.26E+06  94.2973  48.3252  0.000 
70 31  976810  33170  365432  10  1.19E+08  21.2915  60.5926  0.000 
71 25  9476.13  1646.11  88930  -6.2  3.18E+06  120.572  69.4876  0.000 
72  9  161317  1440.91 2.70E+06 -3.66667 1.56E+07 88.6059 56.3156  0.000 
73 31  5570.5  323.724  569140  -5.87097  2.02E+07  60.3902  21.2052  0.000 
74 31  202401  6764.74  98730  -0.40323  4.02E+07  61.273  63.5564  0.016 
75 29  29576.7  16429.7  17820  -8.34483 1.51E+06 98.0552 90.6124  0.000 
76 9  6311.04  431.728  191800  -3  4.69E+06  84.2726  35.7033  0.000 
77 15  269.181  336.14  230800  -7  4.25E+06  43.5325  15.86  0.000 
78 9  9118.48  2148.57  62050  8  2.49E+06  111.686  68.2478  0.000 
79 9  16019.4  2305.12  64800  10  3.61E+06  107.551  67.2122  0.000 
80 9  10909.8  2378.26  25430  6  1.98E+06  92.061  59.3622  0.000 
81 31  1187.01  298.249  581540  -1.01613  1.05E+07  40.9794  20.8335  0.048 
82 31  609.654  150.378  94080  -5.35484  7.30E+06  61.29  10.4184  0.000 
83  31  55236.2  2856.82  328550 3.70968  1.63E+07  128.118  46.4816 0.000 
84  31  401.728  269.825 1.22E+06 -2.83871 7.68E+06 48.0145 21.4648  0.000 
85  31  1651.73  450.989 1.03E+06 -6.67742 1.84E+06 103.318 35.7781  0.000 
86 21  1333.35  2821.78  2030  9.90476  1.07E+06  119.059  41.5348  0.000 
87  31  272667  3084.51 1.91E+06 -1.19355 7.51E+07 33.4111 68.5132  0.000 
88 9  11621.4  504.713  32910  6.77778  4.32E+06  128.047  46.1289  0.000   29
89  20  8717.99  429.954  1.57E+06 1.35 2.10E+06  116.527  55.92  0.000 
90 31  20010.9  1162.46  446304  -7.83871  2.18E+07  53.3544  44.8942  0.000 
91 11  1425.1  153.513  784090  -1.27273  1.51E+07  41.6447  23.2727  0.000 
92 9  1220.93  2239.7  823290  6  1.70E+06  105.503  29.0744  0.000 
93 31  1074.3  177.379  143000  -1.93548  1.67E+07  34.6066  8.03419  0.000 
94 31  138798  23018  33880  10  1.45E+07  103.491  59.3268  0.000 
95 30  22610.5  15230.7  267990  10  3.34E+06  56.7079  83.9667  0.000 
96 31  2314.35  641.982  121400  -0.90323  3.45E+06  70.2642  51.6468  -0.419 
97  31  787.607  272.036 1.27E+06 -4.01613 6.84E+06 44.2808 14.3945  0.016 
98 31  54551.5  268.208  910770  -3.25806 8.56E+07 53.4938 31.3245  -0.032 
99 31  37839.1  26471.8  306830  10  4.17E+06  74.3181  70.9781  0.000 
100 30  9930.23  4646.8  309500  -9.66667  1.45E+06  95.0792  45.5317  0.000 
101  29  54492.3  394.598  770880 1.58621  9.88E+07  34.1169  29.4793 0.276 
102 21  4003.18  2909.6  74430  2.2381  2.40E+06  73.2054  53.5324  0.000 
103 25  2134.65  898.941  452860  10  3.75E+06  92.9557  12.9864  0.000 
104 31  2079.83  1664.04  397300  -2.70968  3.67E+06  52.1192  45.4703  0.000 
105  31  22688.5  2349.86 1.28E+06  1.25806  1.95E+07 33.2358 66.2539  0.161 
106 31  43322.9  1064.31  298181  0.096774  5.50E+07  61.0897  44.1613  0.032 
107  11  337691  3417.74  304387 8.27273  3.85E+07  50.9928  61.2409 0.000 
108 31  33728.6  8520.86  91500  6.70968  9.67E+06  61.2171  38.5006  0.000 
109  11  115127  1502.73  230340 6.36364  2.27E+07  56.8513  54.3591 0.000 
110  9  1.56E+06 2823.27 1.69E+07  4.55556  1.48E+08 63.7616 73.3456  0.000 
111 31  352.607  276.572  24670  -6.5  5.75E+06  31.4513  6.01194  -0.210 
112  31  173444  9752.78  2.15E+06 -10 1.27E+07  77.3519  70.7787  0.000 
113 31  2740.19  575.076  192530  -2.22581  6.54E+06  67.9585  38.6587  0.000 
114  3  46752.6  1754.6  102136  -6 1.06E+07  51.2559  51.5 0.000 
115 31  515.572  294.102  71620  -4.64516  3.69E+06  45.7418  27.1265  0.581 
116 9  39272  3798.91  48800  7.66667  5.36E+06  125.961  56.7589  0.778 
117 8  13869.2  10076.7  20120  10  1.99E+06  114.092  50.7887  0.000 
118  31  255028 4205.72  1.22E+06 5.3871 3.18E+07  49.8827  49.6552  0.452 
119 31  196702  12382.3  499515  6.25806  3.77E+07  37.7132  73.09  0.097 
120  31  4590.41  559.58 64630 5.90323  1.54E+07  68.7962  21.5032  0.000 
121  23  3935.98  239.825 2.38E+06 -5.47826 2.12E+07 27.7151 23.0043  -0.304 
122 31  382.711  1247.46  17200  -8.77419  685419  155.558  19.249  0.000 
123 31  63918.2  25270.7  411620  10  8.45E+06  60.9403  82.8774  0.000 
124 31  40503.7  41171.4  39550  10  6.62E+06  68.726  62.0661  0.000 
125 31  28652.2  672.759  183780  -8.93548  1.07E+07  53.8715  47.4955  0.000 
126 5  5003.56  209.057  140600  -2.8  6.09E+06  145.718  26.888  0.000 
127 11  2919.48  182.983  883590  -3.18182  2.96E+07  49.5604  26.9409  0.000 
128 31  83204.9  1646.19  510890  2.8871  5.03E+07  63.1807  27.3484  -0.210 
129 31  773.565  379.408  54390  -5.54839  3.06E+06  88.9808  24.6661  -0.290 
130 31  11365.8  1721.57  155360  -6.45161  7.29E+06  77.2686  54.6606  0.000 
131  31  117228  2321.53  769630 6.12903  5.07E+07  29.1456  51.7823 0.000 
132 8  31799.4  594.427  469930  -9  4.34E+06  100.071  44.6763  0.000 
133 17  924.923  275.381  197100  -4.70588  1.85E+07  30.0144  11.1476  -0.118 
134 9  420007  1017.12  579350  6.55556  5.10E+07  83.9678  66.99  0.000 
135 31  576437  16255  240880  10  5.71E+07  52.6106  86.501  0.000   30
136  31  4.75E+06 23536.7 9.16E+06  10  2.40E+08 19.0281 75.1703  0.000 
137  31  5023.67  5184  175020 2.41935  3.02E+06  38.1001  87.1052 0.000 
138 9  111058  623.6  414240  -9  2.32E+07  53.5047  38.2489  0.000 
139  31  105271  3777.32  882050 8.64516  1.73E+07  47.7152  80.9206 0.000 
140 15  30846.2  261.931  325490  -7  7.00E+07  70.699  21.6387  0.000 
141 10  11643.7  283.389  527970  -2  1.54E+07  82.8952  23.461  -0.400 
142 31  3044.65  542.23  743390  -4.3871  6.83E+06  74.9179  37.1216  0.000 
143 26  13335.3  627.929  386850  -1.67308  9.36E+06  54.7658  26.9727  0.173 
1 Dataset includes observations for 143 countries over maximum range of 31 years (1970-2000). 
2 Countries not observed in all years of the dataset still provide efficiency in model estimation 
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Appendix B: Random Effects Models 
 
Table B:1: Random Effects Estimators for Panel Data Models Estimating the Effect of Openness on 
BOD and CO2 Emission Levels while Controlling for National Characteristics. 
VARIABLE  REGRESSAND = BOD 
(MODEL 1) 
REGRESSAND = CO2 
(MODEL 2) 




















































    
# Countries  N = 119  N = 143 




12 df; p-value = 0.0000 
97.85 
12df; p-value = 0.0000 
1 Standard errors provided in parentheses. 
2 * indicates significance at the 5% level or better 
3 ** indicates significance at the 10% level or better 
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BOD Dataset Scatter Plots: 
 
        Figure B:1: Scatter Plot of GDP per Capita Observations Across Countries. 































       1 Max GDP per Capita Observation = $45,951. 95 
        2 Mean GDP per Capita Observation = $6,871. 53 
        3 Median GDP per Capita Observation = $2,091. 63 
 
 
        Figure B:2: Scatter Plot of Total Population Observations Across Countries. 




























       1 Max Population Observation = 1,200,000,000 
        2 Mean GDP per Capita Observation = 48,616,678 
        3 Median GDP per Capita Observation = 9,994,000   33
CO2 Dataset Scatter Plots: 
 
        Figure B:3: Scatter Plot of GDP per Capita Observations Across Countries. 
































       1 Max GDP per Capita Observation = $46,815. 50 
        2 Mean GDP per Capita Observation = $5,434.13 
        3 Median GDP per Capita Observation = $1,399.71 
 
 
        Figure B:4: Scatter Plot of Total Population Observations Across Countries. 




























       1 Max Population Observation = 1,260,000,000 
        2 Mean GDP per Capita Observation = 37,746,439 
        3 Median GDP per Capita Observation = 8,257,500 